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Inherent Limits to the World Trade
Organization’s Article XXI Self-Judging
Security Exception
STUART DAVIS†

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States faces nine concurrent complaints1 in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) for its twenty-five percent tariff
(i.e., import taxes) on foreign steel.2 While the WTO generally
prohibits tariffs between its 164-members,3 the United States justified
its protectionist measure under Article XXI of the WTO that exempts
member states from tariff rules to protect “essential security
interests.”4 Member states historically treated Article XXI as a last
© 2019 Stuart Davis
†
J.D. Candidate (2020), University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author thanks his editors Caleen Kufera, Julia Kenny, and Vanessa Zehnder for their
constant feedback, edits, and comments. He also thanks Professors Michael Van Alstine,
Peter Danchin, and Will Moon for their substantive suggestions and revisions. The author
dedicates this Comment to his lovely fiancé who now likely knows as much about Article
XXI as the author.
1. China first requested consultations—the initial step in the WTO’s dispute resolution
process—on April 4, 2018. See United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum
Products, Request for Consultations By China, WTO Doc. G/L/1222 (Apr. 4, 2018). The
United States subsequently received eight more complaints from India, European Union,
Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey. See G/L/1222 (providing list of
all related complaints against the United States’ steel tariff).
2. The tariff proclamation allowed for individual countries to negotiate and remove the
tariff. Proclamation No. 9705, 83 FR 11625 (May 24, 2018) (amended).
3. The WTO membership accounts for 96.7% of the world’s total GDP and 96.4% of
total international trade (i.e., exchange of goods and services) between countries. PETER
JOHN WILLIAMS, A HANDBOOK ON ACCESSION TO THE WTO, 1, https://www.wto.org/english
/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c1s1p1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat, A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement subsumed the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and created the modern WTO. For consistency and
clarity, article citations hereinafter refer to the modern, complete WTO Agreement).
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resort and rarely invoke the article to ensure no member state could
abuse its language to skirt WTO rules.5 The complainants accuse the
United States of pretextually using Article XXI to benefit its
domestic steel industry.6
The seemingly esoteric dispute over the WTO’s Article XXI
national security exception presents an existential threat to the
international trading system. On the one hand, the United States
argues that national security issues solely constitute “political matters
not susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO dispute
settlement. Every member of the WTO retains the authority to
determine for itself… its essential security interests.”7 In other
words, any WTO member may interpret XXI’s margin of
appreciation (i.e., discretion in applying a treaty’s terms) for
themselves.
On the other hand, the nine complainants assert the steel tariffs
violate the rights of WTO members, the U.S.’ obligations under the
WTO, and impair the core pillars of the international trading system.8
They contend neither the United States nor any other WTO member
possesses unlimited discretion in applying Article XXI when it
conflicts with the rights of other members. Unless the parties settle
their dispute in the interim, the case will eventually appear before the
WTO’s Appellate Body (AB).9 The AB must address the key issue in
this case, and their answer will shape the course of international trade
for decades: to what extent may a WTO member decide Article
XXI’s margin of appreciation for itself? The dispute also begs
practical questions about the ability of the WTO to bind members to
trade rules. Does the AB possess the authority to decide the issue? If

5. See infra Part I(A).
6. WTO disputes usually include third party member states. The current dispute
includes Brazil, Columbia, Egypt, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine,
Venezuela, and Bolivia. Panel Report, United States - Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminum Products - Request for Consultations by the European Union, WTO Doc.
G/L/1243 (June 6, 2018).
7. United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products,
Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/13 (July 6, 2018).
8. See United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, Request for
Consultations by the European Union, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 6, 2018) (listing,
among others, violation of Article I’s Most Favored Nation provision and Article II’s
national treatment provision).
9. See infra note 78.
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the AB possesses that authority, how should it balance a sovereign’s
claim of national security on one side and international free trade on
the other?
The WTO provides member states some margin of appreciation
in complying with its rules,10 but it has never formally ruled on the
scope of Article XXI.11 The WTO should settle the steel tariff
dispute12 by rejecting the U.S.’ invocation of Article XXI because it
contravenes the language, structure, and purpose of the WTO, it
exceeds the reasonable legal boundaries of self-judging provisions
under the WTO’s margin of appreciation, and impermissibly
threatens the viability of the WTO system based on past WTO cases
that placed limits on similar exception articles within the WTO
Agreement.
This article provides the AB an analytical template to both
resolve the current steel dispute and address future invocations of
Article XXI. The analysis elucidates why the WTO should narrowly
construe Article XXI to preserve the international trading system.13
Part II presents historical and legal context to Article XXI. First, it
traces the development of the WTO, emphasizing the strained but
limited inclusion of Article XXI.
Second, it describes the
international law’s rules for treaty interpretation and the binding
nature of the AB’s decisions. Part III analyzes the scope of Article
XXI through a textual and analogical analysis of the WTO
Agreement’s object and purpose. This section argues the WTO
Agreement’s margin of appreciation should preclude any unbounded
interpretation of Article XXI’s language. It also analogizes the
present steel tariff dispute with the factually and legally similar WTO
Shrimp-Turtle14 case. The legal reasoning behind Shrimp-Turtle
illustrates why Article XXI’s application should be limited whenever
it threatens the multilateral trading system. Part IV concludes with a

10. See infra Part III(A).
11. See infra Part II(A).
12. The WTO dispute settlement procedure seeks to avoid formal judgement between
member states. The WTO’s Appellate Body only makes a substantive legal ruling if both
parties are unsatisfied with the arbitration process. This paper’s legal analysis is not limited
to the United States steel tariff but applicable to any Article XXI dispute formally submitted
to the Appellate Body for resolution. See infra note 78.
13. See G. John Ikenberry, The End of Liberal International Order, 94 INT’L AFF., 7
(2018) (discussing the current and likely continuing threats to the multilateral, rule-based
international order).
14. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/23 (Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
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summary of why reasonable limits should be placed on Article XXI’s
application and how the U.S.’ steel tariffs impermissibly exceed
those boundaries.
II. BACKGROUND
The present dispute centers on the meaning of Article XXI(b) of
the WTO Agreement. It states:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed… (b) to
prevent any contracting party from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests… (ii) relating to traffic in
arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or
other emergency in international relations.15
This section first traces the historical development and
application of Article XXI. It subsequently provides a legal overview
of how the WTO’s AB should adjudicate the present dispute under
international law of treaty interpretation.
A. Historical Context
In 1944, at the close of World War II, the leaders of the Allied
powers gathered in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to design a
stable post-world international environment.16 These leaders sought
to avoid the devastation of the previous decades with strong,
multilateral international institutions.17 The initial negotiations
eventually crystalized into the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”) in 1948.18 The GATT operated not only as a
comprehensive international trade agreement, but also as an
international organization to administer the agreement.19 The WTO
15. WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. 21.
16. See JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (2006) (noting that idea of trade institution was raised during
Bretton Woods but not implemented).
17. The United States championed the multilateral system following the war and lead
the development of diplomatic, economic, and security frameworks centered around
American long-term national interest. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE
ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER, 2 (2011).
18. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2 (2006).
19. Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT
Dispute Settlement Panel and the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of
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eventually replaced the GATT in 1994, but maintained its founding
articles and principles.20 Most importantly, the WTO retained the
GATT’s principle of Most Favored Nation (“MFN”), which requires
member states to extend any trade deal (i.e., reduced tariffs) made
with one member state to all member states.21 This principle targeted
the “beggar thy neighbor”22 protectionist trade policies endemic to the
interwar period.23 The GATT addressed one of the largest market
failures of international trade through collective rules, tariff
obligations, and arbitration procedures.
1. Article XXI Drafters Balanced State Sovereignty with Treaty
Integrity
The GATT’s binding rules sparked criticism from member states
from its inception.24 Member states worried that the agreement could
have a coercive effect on national sovereignty.25 In response, the
drafters of the GATT negotiated several limited exceptions to the
MFN principle.26 The drafters included Article XXI, the national
security exception, to avoid the absurd result of penalizing a member
state for placing tariffs against another member state who is at war

Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 603, 606 (1987).
20. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 38-41 (1990) (detailing
the circumstances for an updated international trade institution); see also Amelia Porges, The
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 63 (T.P. Stewart ed., 1996) (discussing the process leading to the WTO’s
creation).
21. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
22. Beggar thy neighbor or “tit-for-tat” characterizes the practice of one state placing
taxes on imported goods to help a domestic industry, thus sparking a cycle of increasingly
stringent reciprocal tariffs. XING LIJUAN, BEHIND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM:
LEGAL INDIGENIZATION AND THE WTO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 51 (2014).
23. Id.
24. See John H. Jackson, Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement
Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects, in THE WTO AS AN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 161, 163 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998) (outlining a number
of “birth defects” that clouded the GATT’s legal status); see also Senator Eugene Millikin on
GATT, at the Hearings on Reciprocal Trade Agreements Expansion Act of 1951, before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 82d Congress, 1st Sess. 92 (1951) (“Anyone who reads GATT
is likely to have his sanity impaired”).
25. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 95.
26. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 18, at 4 (describing the GATT’s eight exceptions to
basic rules).
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with them.27 The drafters agreed its application should be limited, but
disagreed on whether states themselves or the GATT’s adjudicating
body should decide what is covered under Article XXI.28
Article XXI’s language does not expressly declare its national
security exception self-judging,29 though its text could plausibly
convey such an interpretation.30 The drafters recognized that such an
interpretation could create a nullifying loophole for the GATT.31
John Leddy, the U.S. representative and co-author of Article XXI,
agreed with his international colleagues.32 He stated that “there was a
great danger of having too wide an exception… that would permit
anything under the sun.”33 Leddy and his international colleagues
wanted Article XXI’s language flexible enough to accommodate
concerns about national security while limited enough to prevent
commercial tariffs disguised as national security measures.34
This balanced construction of Article XXI eventually prevailed,
and the GATT retained the article’s seemingly self-judging
language,35 while expressly limiting its application to war or
international emergencies without enumerating specific definitions of
these terms.36 The drafters believed that these broad boundaries and

27. Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
697, 702 (2011).
28. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT: ART. XXI
SECURITY EXCEPTIONS 603, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt19
94_art21_jur.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
29. “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed… to prevent any contracting party
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests.” WTO Agreement, art. 21. In the current steel tariff dispute, the United States
rested its argument on the plain text reading of the article alone. See infra text accompanying
notes 144‒147.
30. See KRZYSZTOF J. PELC, MAKING AND BENDING INTERNATIONAL RULES: THE DESIGN
OF EXCEPTIONS AND ESCAPE CLAUSES IN TRADE LAW, 102 (2016) (noting Article XXI lacks
any explicit mention of self-judging language).
31. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conference
on Trade & Emp’t, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, at 19, U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/A/PV/33 (1947) [hereinafter Preparatory Comm].
32. Alford, supra note 27, at 698.
33. Preparatory Comm., supra note 31, at 20.
34. Id.
35. See infra Part III(C).
36. Article XXI provides a list of concrete exceptions to the agreement, including trade
relating to fissionable materials and implements of war. Unfortunately, the third and final
exception repeats the vague language from Article XXI’s opening clause, “[Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent any contracting party from taking any action] taken
in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” WTO Agreement, art. 21.
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the good faith compliance of member states would prevent future
abuses, namely attempts to cloak commercial protectionist measures
with alleged national security emergencies.37
The United States overall negotiating strategy behind the GATT
also supports a limited reading of Article XXI. On the one hand, the
American delegation pushed for self-judging national security
language to preserve American sovereignty.38 The Cold War made
national security a top priority, and American diplomats did not want
to cede policy control to an international organization.39 On the other
hand, the United States needed the multilateral, rule-based trading
system to succeed to solidify American economic interests at home
and abroad.40 The American delegation insisted on the GATT’s (and
later the WTO’s) dispute resolution mechanism because they
believed binding rules and formal arbitration would promote greater
compliance with multilateral trade rules.41 Article XXI’s language
reflects the delicate balance between these twin objectives: national
security and trade compliance.
2. The Marshall Plan Provided an Early Indication of Article
XXI’s Limited Scope
The United States first invoked Article XXI in a trade dispute
with Czechoslovakia in 1949.42 The United States had recently
launched the “Marshall Plan,” a sweeping post-war strategy to
combat the spread of Communism in Europe.43 The Marshall Plan
called for free trade of all products, including military supplies, to

37. Alford, supra note 27, at 699.
38. See Senate Finance Committee, Preliminary Summary of Geneva Draft of ITO
Charter, Changes from New York Draft, WORLD TRADE LAW, 3 (Sep. 15, 1947),
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/05/more-gatt-article-xxi-negotiating-histo
ry.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2018).
39. Melvyn P. Leffler, The American Conception of National Security and the
Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948, 89 AM. HIS. R. 346, 358 (1984).
40. See ROBERT KAGAN, THE WORLD AMERICA MADE 40 (2013) (associating American
twentieth century prosperity with the rule-based, international order it helped create).
41. William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States’
Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1225, 1231 (1998).
42. Contracting Parties Decision, Article XXI – United States Exports Restrictions (June
8, 1949), GATT CP .3/SR22 – II/28 (Aug. 11, 1952).
43. See generally BENN STEIL, THE MARSHALL PLAN: DAWN OF THE COLD WAR (2018)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the history, implementation, and ramifications of
the Marshall Plan).
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Western Europe but restricted exports to Communist Eastern
Europe.44 The Marshall Plan provided member states an early test
case to evaluate the meaning of Article XXI.45
Czechoslovakia faced pressure from the Soviet Union to decline
assistance, so they challenged the Marshall Plan as a violation of the
GATT.46 The United States justified its protectionism under Article
XXI, arguing that it served both the U.S.’ and its Western allies’
national security interest.47 The British delegation believed the
United States should be able to determine which issues affect its
national interest, but should not have unfettered discretion in its
usage of Article XXI because it could undermine the entire
agreement.48 Ultimately, the GATT members dodged the substantive
question by voting seventeen to one against the referral of the issue to
arbitration.49
The substantive avoidance of the issue initiated a pattern that
would continue until today.50 Article XXI has only been invoked six
times, and it has never been formally adjudicated by either the GATT
or the WTO.51 Presently, the United States argues the lack of Article
XXI jurisprudence highlights the WTO’s complete deference to
member states on the specific subject of national security.52
However, this argument fails to acknowledge the historical respect

44. Id. at 709.
45. PELC, supra note 30, at 101.
46. MICHAEL BRECHER AND JOHNATHAN WILKENFELD, A STUDY OF CRISIS, 339-41
(1997).
47. Vice Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Speech by the Head of the
Czechoslovak Delegation Under Item 14 on the Agenda, at 10, CP.3/38 (June 2, 1949).
48. GATT Council, Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, at 9, CP.3/SR.22
(June 8, 1949).
49. Id. The WTO’s modern arbitration procedures had not been established in 1949. If
the GATT members had voted to hear the dispute, then it would have been referred to the
“Working Party” or an early version of a Dispute Resolution Panel. PELC, supra note 30, at
103.
50. See PELC, supra note 30, at 101 (explaining how member states have raised Article
XXI six times as a defense but never insisted upon its usage during arbitration).
51. E.g., 1996 Helms-Burton Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1, May 13 1996; Trade
Measures Taken By The European Community Against The Socialist Federal Republic Of
Yugoslavia Communication From the European Communities. GATT L/6948. Panel Report,
United States – Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, March 13 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st
supplement 1985); United Kingdom and Falklands (GATT Doc. L/5319/Rev. 1 (May 5
1982); Sweden—Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, Nov 17, 1975, GATT/L/4250 at
1; COM.IND/6/Add.4, p.53 (notification) (United States invoked Article XXI as justification
of its embargo against Cuba in 1962); Ghana v. Portugal, SR.19/12 at 196 (1961).
52. PELC, supra note 30, at 101.
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paid to Article XXI’s unstated limitations. In addition, this argument
fails to account for how the text and history of Article XXI
intertwines with the overarching object and purpose of the WTO.
B. Legal Context
The WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) specifies the rules for interpreting the
WTO agreement. The DSU’s interpretation occurs “in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”53
1. Customary International Law Governing WTO Treaty
Interpretation
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)
provides the rules for treaty interpretation in public international
law.54 Even non-signatories to the treaty, like the United States,
recognize the binding nature of the VCLT as customary international
law.55 The WTO’s dispute settlement process, like any other
international tribunal, must adhere these rules when interpreting its
statute in a dispute between member parties.56 Both the dispute
settlement panels and the AB use these rules to ensure the rights and
obligations of the WTO Agreement are not enlarged or diminished by
member states.57
The VCLT’s general rule of treaty interpretation calls for
treaties to be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose.”58 The VCLT
stipulates the object and purpose to be found within its preamble,

53. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art.
3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
54. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 311, art. 1
[hereinafter VCLT].
55. U.S. Department of State, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, https://www.s
tate.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
56. DSU, supra note 53, art. 3.2.
57. Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 46, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (adopted Dec. 19, 1997).
58. VCLT, supra note 54, art. 31.
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annexes, and supplementary instruments or agreements.59 Finally,
subsequent agreement or practice between the states can be used to
further elucidate treaty terms.60
2. Appellate Body’s Decisions Bind Member States
WTO member states acceded to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) in as part of the Marrakesh Agreement creating
the modern WTO.61 Article 1.1 of the DSU requires member parties
to abide by the rules and procedures governing disputes.62 The DSU
authorized the creation of the Appellate Body and its jurisdiction to
issue binding decisions over trade disputes related to the WTO
Agreement’s provisions. According to Article 3.2 of the DSU,
“Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”63 The
Appellate Body, therefore, retains the authority to interpret Article
XXI’s terms and their impact on the rights and obligations of
Member states.
While the United States may challenge the meaning of Article
XXI and its application to the current tariff dispute, it may not
question the AB’s authority to decide a dispute over WTO
Agreement terms between two or more WTO members. The
international legal maxim, pacta sunt servanda, or agreements must
be kept, constitutes the bedrock of international treaty law.64 The
United States acceded to the WTO and the Dispute Settlement
Understanding and cannot unilaterally impose its interpretation the
Agreement’s terms in a dispute. The U.S.’ non-compliance with the
AB’s decision not only violates the express terms of the DSU, but its
object and purpose to preserve “the effective functioning of the WTO
and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and
obligations of members.”65 The next section provides the AB an

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
62. DSU, supra note 53, art 1.1.
63. DSU, supra note 53, art. 3.2.
64. VCLT, supra note 54, art 26.
65. DSU, supra note 53, art 3.3.
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analytical roadmap to structure their interpretation of Article XXI in
both the current steel dispute and subsequent invocations of national
security.
III. ANALYSIS
Treaty analysis starts with its express terms, but Article XXI’s
ambiguous language limits the AB’s ability to definitively determine
its scope. While the preceding historical overview of Article XXI
suggests a bounded reading of the text,66 VCLT rules mandate an
examination of the treaty’s object and purpose to fully grasp the
meaning of a treaty’s terms in a given dispute. This section offers the
AB an analytical roadmap for Article XXI. It first analyzes Article
XXI in light of the WTO’s object and purpose and provides further
analytical backing by analogizing the current dispute to the
influential WTO dispute, Shrimp-Turtle.
A. Object and Purpose Analysis: U.S. Steel Tariffs Exceed
Article XXI’s Scope Based on the WTO’s Margin of
Appreciation
The general rule of treaty interpretation is to read a contested
clause “in light of its object and purpose.”67 A treaty’s object and
purpose can usually be found in its preamble,68 but in this case the
WTO’s preamble cannot elucidate the full scope of Article XXI’s
application on its own. The preamble calls for greater cooperation in
the reduction of tariffs, but never addresses the U.S.’ specific
assertion that Article XXI is self-judging within the narrow category
of national security.69 The international law concept of margin of
appreciation provides the necessary analytical leverage to connect
Article XXI with the WTO’s object and purpose.
Margin of appreciation provides states some latitude in
complying with treaty obligations but only within the reasonable
limits of the treaty’s object and purpose.70 The WTO’s preamble
expresses its overarching object and purpose as “mutually
66. Supra Part I(A).
67. VCLT, supra note 54, art. 31.
68. Id.
69. WTO Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl.
70. Saida El Boudouhi, A Comparative Approach of the National Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine Before the ECtHR, investment tribunals and WTO Dispute Settlement
Bodies (European University Institute Working Paper 2015/27, 2015), http://cadmus.eui.eu/
bitstream/handle/1814/35660/RSCAS2015_27.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (last visited
Oct. 11, 2018).
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advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs . . . to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce.”71 Therefore, Article XXI’s margin of
appreciation allows the United States to enact measures to protect its
national security, so long as it does not violate the WTO’s object and
purpose to reduce tariffs and discriminatory treatment. The WTO’s
consistent usage of margin of appreciation in its jurisprudence
necessitates its inclusion in Article XXI analysis.
1. The Concept of Margin of Appreciation in the WTO
The WTO system hinges on shared authority between its
institutional rules and its member’s sovereignty.72 WTO adjudicative
decisions inevitably intrudes on domestic law, so the WTO affords
limited deference to its members when complying with some of its
rules.73 The bounded discretion ensures members have some room to
reasonably comply with its decisions without providing so much
autonomy that members could circumvent their obligations.
Bounded discretion in applying multilateral rules is not unique
to the WTO.74 The European Court of Human Rights first formulated
the concept in its “margin of appreciation” doctrine to provide states
limited and reasonable discretion when deviating from international
obligations based on individual societal or national interests.75
Margin of appreciation doctrine initially arose in response to
international policies that threatened a state’s national security.76 The
earliest uses of the doctrine justified derogations from treaty
obligations during national emergency.77

71. WTO Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl.
72. Tomer Broude, Selective Subsidiary and Dialectic Deference in the World Trade
Organization, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55 (2016).
73. The paradigmatic example of the interplay between WTO and member state
governance comes from Article XX. See infra Part III; see also Broude, supra note 72, at 56
(explaining WTO’s multilevel governance structure).
74. Oil Platforms (Iran v. US) [2003] ICJ Rep 90; Avena (Mexico v. US) [2004] ICJ
Rep 77; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Opinion of 9 July 2004 [2004] ICJ Rep 136.
75. Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 843 (1999).
76. See Lawless, v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 195 (holding that a state may
justify derogations from its international obligations during an emergency but the court
reserves the right to scrutinize the decision).
77. Benvenisti, supra note 75, at 845.
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While the WTO does not use the exact term margin of
appreciation in its charter or agreements, the WTO adjudicative
panels apply the concept in its decisions.78 For example, the AB of
the WTO79 makes recommendations on how member states can adjust
its domestic legislation to avoid penalty.80 The AB also provides
member states accused of rule violation a “reasonable period of time”
to become in compliance.81 These prudential considerations show the
AB’s careful methodology in avoiding either overt or rigid sanctions
on members for alleged WTO rule violations. The AB uses margin
of appreciation to recognize the reasonable constraints members may
have in compliance with the rules and to suggest feasible ways for
members to become compliant given domestic limitations.82
Even though a variety of international courts invoke margin of
appreciation differently, the concept largely consists of two
elements.83 The WTO’s AB, recognized two elements in its
jurisprudence.84 The first involves “judicial deference” or giving
member courts some latitude in evaluating whether its government is
in compliance with WTO rules.85 The second is “normative
flexibility,” which provides a zone of legality in which states could
reasonably reach differing legal conclusions based on conflicting
approaches to international norms.86
78. See Broude, supra note 72, at 71 (noting how Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding instructs panels to make objective assessments of the applicability and
conformity of the decision).
79. The Appellate Body is equivalent to an appeals court within the WTO. The AB is
comprised of seven people nominated by WTO members. They can uphold, modify or
reverse the findings of dispute panels. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement:
Appellate Body, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2018).
80. For example in Shrimp-Turtle, the AB recommended that the United States soften its
ban imported shrimp caught using particular types of nets. See discussion infra Part III(A).
81. See Boudouhi, supra note 70, at 6 (discussing how the WTO Appellate Body uses
the margin of appreciation concept within their jurisprudence).
82. Id.
83. Yuval Shany, Towards a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law? 16 EUR. J. INT’L. L., 907, 909 (2005).
84. Annex 1A to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15
1994, 33 ILM (1994).
85. See Ireland v. UK, 2 EHRR 25, at 91-92 (1978) (holding the United Kingdom’s
courts determine whether the government has power to make detention orders under the
Emergency Provisions Amendment Act).
86. Sheffield v. UK, 27 EHRR 163, 179 (1998); see also Appellate Body, Japan – Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages II, 34, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996) (“WTO
rules are not so rigid or inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in
confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real
world.”).
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Margin of appreciation also imposes two constraints that apply
generally. First, states must act in good faith when exercising its
discretion in complying with the terms of a treaty.87 The drafters of
Article XXI recognized the importance of good faith and called on
member states to respect the integrity of the WTO agreement with
good faith interpretations of Article XXI.88 Second, international
courts possess the authority to review whether a national policy
decision conforms with the object and purpose of the governing
obligation.89 The WTO’s arbitration process also uses this same
review power in its decisions.90 In sum, margin of appreciation gives
states some flexibility in complying with WTO rules, but states must
use this flexibility in good faith and its actions can be reviewed to see
if it violates the WTO Agreement’s object and purpose.
The United States argues that the margin of appreciation should
not apply to Article XXI and member states should have sole
discretion in determining the article’s limits.91 The preceding
analysis refutes this argument by demonstrating how the WTO
incorporates margin of appreciation into its decisions even when not
expressly mentioned in the text of the agreement.92 The next section
presents how the WTO should conduct a margin of appreciation
analysis of Article XXI.
2. The U.S.’ Reading of Article XXI Exceeds Its Margin of
Appreciation in Light of the WTO’s Object and Purpose
The AB functions as the WTO’s appellate court,93 and it
incorporates margin of appreciation and object and purpose analysis
from the VCLT94 when deciding whether a member has breached the

87. VCLT, supra note 54, art. 26.
88. Shany, supra note 83, at 607.
89. Id. at 911.
90. See US – Tax Treatment of ‘Foreign Sales Corp’, 5, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/ARB
(adopted Aug. 30, 2002) (Asserting that margin of appreciation must be used to assess the
gravity of a wrongful act); see also infra Part III(A).
91. See Third Party Executive Summary of the United States of America, Russia—
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ⁋ 28, WTO Doc. DS512 (Feb. 27, 2018) (plain text
and drafting history of Article XXI shows that the national security exception is selfjudging).
92. But see id. (asserting the plain text of Article XXI is sufficient in establishing the
fully self-judging nature of the article).
93. See supra note 79.
94. Repertory of Appellate Body Reports, I.3.1 General Rules of Treaty Convention –
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e
/repertory_e/i3_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
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terms of the WTO Agreement.95 In particular, the AB “is required to
have recourse to context and object and purpose to elucidate the
relevant meaning of the word or term. This logical progression
provides a framework for proper interpretive analysis.”96 The WTO’s
AB uses the five objectives within the WTO agreement’s preamble to
structure its interpretive analysis:97 keep the peace, promote world
economic development and welfare, work towards sustainable
development and environmental protection, reduce poverty of the
poorest part of the world, and manage economic crises that might
erupt partly due to the circumstances of globalization and
interdependence.98 The AB may use one or all of these purposes in
its margin of appreciation analysis depending on the context of the
contested article.99
The WTO AB’s reliance on object and purpose to resolve
disputes also has specific precedents in the context of protectionist
claims against the United States.100 In United States – Line Pipe,101
the AB held the United States violated the WTO’s Safeguard
Agreement Article 5.1 by restricting imported Korean carbon pipes
due to alleged safety concerns.102 Even though a small percentage of
the imported pipes posed a safety risk, the U.S.’ import restriction
exceeded the scope of the article in light of the WTO’s purpose to
lower trade barriers between members.103 SA Article 5.1’s margin of
95. VCLT, supra note 54, art. 31. The United States has not ratified the VCLT but
considers most of its provisions customary international law. OLIVER DORR & KIRSTEN
SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, 91
(2018).
96. Appellate Body, United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, ⁋ 268, WTO Doc. WT/DS350/AB/R (adopted June 2, 2009).
97. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 81.
98. WTO Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl.
99. See Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 21
EUR. J. INT’L. L. 605, 622 (2010) (describing how the purpose of a treaty’s provision
influences the AB’s margin of appreciation analysis).
100. The WTO’s dispute settlement procedure operates at multiple tiers. While it
encourages negotiations and consultations between parties, states may submit a dispute to
the Dispute Settlement Body which convenes a “panel” of experts to hear the case. Either
side may appeal the panel’s ruling to the Appellate Body which can uphold, modify or
reverse the panel’s conclusions. The Dispute Settlement Body, which consists of All WTO
members, must accept or reject the Appellate Body’s decision, but rejection requires
consensus from the members. Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2018).
101. Appellate Body, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WTO Doc. WT/DS202/AB/R,
(adopted Feb. 15, 2002).
102. Id. ⁋ 251.
103. Id.
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appreciation allowed importation safeguards, but only to the extent
necessary to protect American consumers without infringing on
international trade.104 The AB’s consistent reliance on both margin of
appreciation and object and purposes provides sound justification for
why Article XXI should be similarly analyzed under the same
framework.
The U.S.’ steel tariff violates Article XXI’s margin of
appreciation in light of the WTO’s key object and purposes:105 it
weakens international security and burdens economic development.
First, the U.S. steel tariff contravenes the original purpose of the
WTO to mitigate trade tensions that can erupt into armed conflict
between international powers.106 The U.S. steel tariff has escalated
tensions between the United States and triggered a “tit for tat” trade
war with the largest economies in the world.107 Article XXI’s margin
of appreciation includes member states protecting their own national
security interests, but it would seem unreasonable in light of the
WTO’s object and purpose, to use the exception to jeopardize the
economic interests of other member states.108
Second, the United States tariffs oppose the WTO’s objective to
stimulate overall economic development. The founding document of
the WTO, The Marrakesh Agreement, asserted that higher living
standards, full employment and sustainable development can be
achieved through “substantial reduction of tariffs and other obstacles
to trade.”109 The United States steel tariffs may benefit the American
steel industry, but it appears to damage other sectors of the United
States and world economy.110 Article XXI’s margin of appreciation

104. Id. ⁋ 258.
105. The other three object and purposes mentioned in the preamble (i.e., work towards
sustainable development and environmentalism, reduce poverty, and manage economic
crises) are likely applicable as well; however, a full factual analysis behind the United States
Steel Tariff and its global impact is beyond the scope of this paper.
106. Contribute to Peace and Stability, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto
.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10thi_e/10thi09_e.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
107. Mary A. Marchant & H. Holly Wang, U.S.—China Trade Dispute and Potential
Impacts on Agriculture, 33 CHOICES 1, 1 (2018).
108. See Chad P. Brown, Steel Aluminum, Lumber, Solar: Trump’s Stealth Trade
Protection, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 2 https://piie.com/syst
em/files/documents/pb17-21.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (“The administration’s stated
protectionist measures are likely to damage the US economy and could spiral out of control,
leading to retaliation”).
109. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
110. Brown, supra note 108, at 14.
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might tolerate some negative externalities from a national security
measure, but it seems unreasonable to impose measurable economic
costs on twenty-seven member states plus the European Union.111
Moreover, unlike the American export restrictions in the
Czechoslovakia case112 that benefited Western Europe, the steel tariffs
in the current dispute harm Western Europe.113 The Czechoslovakia
case was never formally adjudicated, but the United States in 1949
could have argued that their Marshall Plan was consistent with the
GATT’s object and purpose because it aimed to bolster the
economies of Western Europe after World War II.114 The United
States cannot make the same argument in the present steel tariff
dispute because they were expressly imposed to benefit the United
States at the expense of other trading partners.115 Article XXI’s
margin of appreciation might have permitted the Marshall Plan’s
protectionist tactics because it furthered the GATT’s goal of
economic development of member states,116 but it would seem
unreasonable to further extend the margin of appreciation to include
deliberate measures that harm other member states’ economies—
directly contravening the WTO’s goal to spur economic
development.
Article XXI’s margin of appreciation allows member states to
reasonably declare and pursue their own national security interests.
The margin of appreciation ends when a member states’ national
security interest infringes on either the security or economic interests
of other member states. Therefore, the U.S.’ steel tariff exceeds the
boundaries of Article XXI’s margin of appreciation.

111. See supra note 7.
112. See supra part I(B).
113. See supra note 7.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 40‒42.
115. President Trump, Remarks by President Trump to the Seventy-Third Session of the
United Nations General Assembly, Sep. 25, 2018, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.white
house.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nationsgeneral-assembly-new-york-ny/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
116. The British delegate served as America’s strongest ally in the Czechoslovakia case,
but even he expressed some doubts about the extent of Article XXI’s self-judging nature. See
supra note 46. If the United States’ argument engendered doubts from its strongest ally in
1949, then it seems even more unlikely their argument would prevail today.
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B. Analogical Analysis: Shrimp-Turtle Shows Article XXI’s
Application Should Be Limited Whenever It Might
Endanger the Multilateral Trade System
Article XXI’s national security exception is not unique within
WTO rules. Member states may derogate from the MFN principle in
other narrow, technical circumstances.117 The most analogous
exception article comes from Article XX or the “General Exception”
provision.118 This article allows member states to deviate from tariff
rules as necessary to protect human, animal, or environmental health,
unless they are applied in an arbitrary, unjustified, or pretextual
manner.119 Shrimp-Turtle constitutes the landmark case in the WTO’s
Article XX jurisprudence.120 The case established the limits of how
far member states may stretch a WTO exception article without
compromising trade rules.121
1. Shrimp-Turtle Explored the Boundaries of WTO’s Exception
Articles
The controversy that lead to Shrimp-Turtle started when the
United States passed Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).122 This law required imported shrimp to be caught using
specialized nets that minimize harm to endangered sea turtles.123
Malaysia, Thailand, India and Pakistan submitted a complaint to the
WTO arguing the law violated the WTO’s MFN principle because it
disadvantages “like products” (i.e., shrimp caught in regular nets)
from member states.124 They asserted that if a state can unilaterally
ignore a WTO obligation under Article XX under an environmental
pretext, then there would be no limit to what a state could ban in the
117. See WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XXIV (providing exceptions for Regional
Trade Agreements like NAFTA or the European Union); Id. art. XII (providing exceptions
for Balance-of-Payments or measures to safeguard a state’s financial well-being); Id. art. IX
(providing temporary relief to trade rules in exceptional circumstances).
118. Id. art. XX.
119. Id.
120. Marc Rietvelt, Multilateral Failure: A Comprehensive Analysis of the
Shrimp/Turtle Decision, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 473, 474 (2004).
121. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, AFTER SEATTLE: FREE TRADE AND THE WTO, IN
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE
MILLENNIUM 60-61 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (criticizing the AB for stretching
Article XX at all).
122. 16 U.S. Code § 1537.
123. Hiranya Fernando Senadhira, The Shrimp-Turtle Dispute: A Brief Legal Analysis, 1
Bridges, no. 3 (1997) https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/the-shrimp-turtledispute-a-brief-legal-analysis (last visited on 5 Apr. 2019).
124. Id.
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name of environmental protection.125 The United States argued that
the ESA adhered to Article XX(b) and (g)126 of the WTO which
exempts protectionist measures if they are “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health… or [relates] to conservation of
exhaustible natural resources.”127
The AB agreed that Section 609 of the ESA furthered a
legitimate environmental policy objective, and member states retain
the authority and autonomy to pursue such policies under the
WTO.128 Nonetheless, environmental protection measures must still
comply with the requirements established in both the text of the
article and of WTO in general.129 The AB held that the U.S.’ ban on
imported shrimp constituted arbitrary discrimination and a disguised
restriction on international trade under the “chapeau” (i.e.,
introductory clause) to Article XX.130
The AB employed a two-step analysis to reach its conclusion.131
First, they examined whether the purported policy objective fell
within the specific exceptions of the Article.132 The United States
satisfied the first step of the analysis because all parties in the dispute
agreed that protecting endangered species is a laudable goal and
should be covered under Article XX’s language.133 WTO member
states should maintain the ability to protect the environment through
individual and collective measures like Section 609 of the ESA.134
The second step of the analysis examines whether a trade
restriction violates Article XX’s chapeau, which requires states to
respect multilateral trade rules even when using the general
exceptions of Article XX.135 The chapeau functions as a prerequisite
to the general exceptions listed in Article XX.136 The AB’s chapeau

125. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 198.
126. WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XX.
127. Id.
128. Panel Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, ¶ 7.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (adopted Jan. 29, 1996).
129. Shrimp Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 165.
130. Id.
131. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 118 (first identifying the policy in question and
second analyzing whether it complies with the chapeau of Article XX).
132. Id. ¶ 125.
133. Id. ¶ 178
134. Id. ¶ 142.
135. Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A
Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 739, 741 (2001).
136. Id.
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analysis corrected the initial Panel’s findings137 which had omitted
specific reference to the WTO’s object and purpose.138 The AB
interpreted the chapeau’s margin of appreciation in light of the object
and purpose of the WTO in general.139 In sum, Article XX allows
derogations from the WTO agreement, as long as they do not
undermine the WTO’s multilateral trading system.140
The U.S.’ argument floundered in step two of the analysis
because it violated Article XX’s chapeau in light of the WTO’s
object and purpose.141 The AB found its import ban on shrimp was
“applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.142
The AB explained even if the U.S.’ individual measure did not
constitute a threat to the system on its own, the type of measure used,
if adopted by other WTO members could threaten the multilateral
trading system.143
2. The Parallels Between Shrimp-Turtle and U.S. Steel Tariffs
The WTO’s AB has never analyzed how Article XXI should be
applied in practice,144 however, the two-step analytical framework
employed in Shrimp-Turtle provides a roadmap for how Article XXI
should be evaluated. The text in both articles provide broad
exceptions to the WTO rules,145 and both Articles need to be
construed in light of the WTO’s object and purpose.146 The two-step
analysis behind Shrimp-Turtle suggests the United States may (1)
retain the authority to decide and enact tariffs in furtherance of
137. WTO disputes are first submitted to a panel of trade experts. Their decision is
equivalent to a trial court in United States jurisprudence. Members may appeal a panel’s
decision to the WTO’s Appellate Body. See supra note 84.
138. MALGOSIA FITZMAURICE ET AL., TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: THIRTY YEARS ON 170 (2010).
139. Id. at 172.
140. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 9.
141. Id. at ¶ 156.
142. See id. ¶ 184 (finding the environmental law applied in a manner that amounts to
both “unjustifiable discrimination [and] arbitrary discrimination”).
143. Id.
144. See surpa note 49.
145. Compare WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XX(b) (“necessary for the protection
of human, animal, or plant life or health”), with WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XXI(b)
(“necessary for the protection of its essential security interests).
146. Compare Fitzmaurice, supra note 138, at 172 (noting Article XX’s chapeau must be
interpreted according to the WTO’s object and purposes), with Part II(B) (arguing Article
XXI’s margin of appreciation requires interpretation of the WTO’s object and purposes).
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national security objectives, but (2) ultimately violate Article XXI of
the WTO because the tariffs could threaten the trading system if
adopted by other WTO members.147
The United States likely passes the first step of the analysis
because it rests on a legitimate, domestic policy objective. Similar to
Section 609 of the ESA’s effort to protect wildlife in Shrimp-Turtle,
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act—the law behind the U.S.’
steel tariffs—likely rests on valid legal reason to protect national
security.148 Congress passed Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act
in 1962 to empower the president to adjust trade policy in response to
national security threats.149 None of the opponents to the U.S.’ tariffs,
like the opponents in Shrimp Turtle, question the President’s
underlying authority to institute tariffs.150 It is also unlikely the AB
would criticize a member state for prioritizing national security
interests in the same way it avoided criticizing a member state for
pursuing environmental interests.151
The United States likely retains the authority to judge for itself
whether its national security interest meets the criteria of Article XXI
in the same way as it retained the authority to decide whether its
environmental protection interest meets the definition of Article
XX.152 The language of Shrimp-Turtle carefully avoided any
repudiation of the U.S.’ judgement in meeting the definition of
Article XX because they the AB did not want to overstep its
jurisdiction by commenting on the wisdom or quality of the law.153
The AB also did not want to convey the message that member states
lacked the authority to proactively enact domestic policies that served
a legitimate policy objective.154 Therefore, the AB will likely find
147. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 186.
148. Brown, supra note 108.
149. Rachel F. Fefer et al., Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for
Congress, CRS REPORT, 1 (2018).
150. The European Union’s request for consultations—a preliminary dispute resolution
procedure within the WTO—questioned the United State’s as-applied interpretation of
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and not the act itself. See supra note 7.
151. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 186 (“WTO Members are free to adopt their
own policies aimed at protecting the environment as long as, in so doing, they fulfill their
obligations and respect the rights of other Members under the WTO Agreement.”).
152. US-Shrimp, Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds58sum_e.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2018).
153. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 185 (“We have not decided that sovereign
nations that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered
species, such as sea turtles. Clearly they can and should.”) (emphasis added).
154. Id.
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that the United States passes the first step of Article XXI analysis
because the steel tariffs reflect a legitimate measure to further its
national security interests.
Nevertheless, the U.S.’ steel tariff fails step two of the analysis.
Its steel tariff violates Article XXI because it would threaten the
multilateral trading system if other members used the same type of
national security justification to avoid its trade obligations.155 The
AB stressed in Shrimp-Turtle that member states can only rely on the
treaty’s exceptions if “they do not undermine the WTO multilateral
trading system thus also abusing the exceptions contained in Article
XX.”156 The AB worried that member states could start compiling an
ever-growing list of valid environmental protections that could
eventually eclipse the entire agreement.157 The U.S.’ argument that
domestic steel protection furthers a national security interest could be
similarly replicated and transferred to other industries by member
states.158 This concern closely reflects the intent of the original
drafters of Article XXI who worried the exception could swallow the
entire agreement.159 While the national security is undoubtedly a
serious concern for member states, the AB should be unwilling to
uphold a unilateral protectionist measure that would undermine the
international trading system.
3. U.S.’ Counterargument Ignores How Their Tariffs Undermine
the Multilateral Trading System
The United States anticipated this comparison and attempted to
distinguish Article XX and Article XXI based on a plain text analysis
that provides members greater autonomy in deciding what constitutes
a national security exception for themselves.160 The United States
notes how Article XX lacks the crucial “which it considers” language
contained in Article XXI.161 The United States contends that these
three words unlock the gate to Article XXI’s protection.162
Furthermore, unlike the chapeau in Article XX which requires
members to consider the stability of the multilateral trading system,
155. Id. ¶ 9.
156. Id. ¶112.
157. Jayati Srivastava and Rajeev Ahuja, Shrimp-Turtle Decision in WTO: Economic
and Systemic Implication for Developing Countries, 37 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 3445, 3452
(2002).
158. See supra note 75.
159. See discussion supra Part I(A).
160. See supra note 75.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id.
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Article XXI omission of a chapeau relieves member states of their
responsibility to consider the impact of their protectionist measure
on the multilateral trading system.163
This argument misconstrues the essential holding of ShrimpTurtle which never questioned a state’s ability to declare and pursue
policy objectives, but rather examined whether the practice would
undermine the overall trading system in light of the WTO’s object
and purpose.164 Shrimp-Turtle stands for the proposition that WTO
exception language can be interpreted and adapted by states within
reasonable margins of appreciation, but the integrity of the
multilateral trading system serves as the ultimate limit to its
application.165 Nothing in the WTO’s history,166 the text of Article
XXI,167 or its jurisprudence168 would permit reading Article XXI
separately from the objects and purposes of the agreement. The
United States may be able to declare and enact measures in
furtherance of its national security interests, but that does not mean it
can completely avoid the fundamental purpose of the WTO to lower
trade barriers between its members.
The United States sole reliance on the text of Article XXI is
insufficient in light of the nuanced analysis from the AB in the
Shrimp-Turtle case. The AB’s decision reflects a delicate balance
between political and environmental concerns on one side and the
integrity of the WTO’s trading system on the other.169 The U.S.’
unadulterated use of Article XXI without any consideration for
fellow WTO members constitutes an impermissible threat to the
multilateral trading system. It creates the type of protectionist
measure that could be easily copied and applied against WTO
members, notwithstanding any good faith claims of national security.

163. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying note 114.
165. See supra Part III(A).
166. See supra Part I.
167. See supra note Part II.
168. See supra note Part III.
169. Former Director-General of the WTO, Renata Benedini, expressed the WTO’s
desire to cooperate with its member states to find both multilateral and unilateral decisions.
Renata Benedini, Complying with the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Decision, in RECONCILING
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 409-15 (Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson, eds. 2001).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Article XXI represents the last-ditch safety valve to WTO rules.
Member states may place tariffs on other members, directly
contradicting the object and purpose of the WTO agreement, but only
in the extraordinary circumstances of national security emergency.
Member states may even judge for themselves what counts as a
national security emergency, but not beyond Article XXI’s margin of
appreciation in light of the WTO’s object and purpose. The U.S.
steel tariffs violate the terms of Article XXI, not because the United
States lacks the ability to decide for themselves what counts as a
national security interest, but because their unrestrained use of Article
XXI threatens the multilateral trading system. The Shrimp-Turtle
decision further illustrates how the U.S.’ sweeping steel tariffs
unreasonably exceeded the boundaries of Article XXI’s national
security exception.
Therefore, the Appellate Body of the WTO must review and
reject tariffs merely invoked in the name of national security to avoid
creating a precedent in which member states may indiscriminately
apply tariffs without consideration of the consequences to members.
Carefully analyzing and striking down such tariffs according to
Article XXI’s history, margin of appreciation, and comparison to
similar precedents would send a powerful signal to all members
within the WTO. No member state, not even the principal architect
of the multilateral trading system,170 can pretextually use national
security to circumvent WTO rules.

170. See supra note 15.

